In a recent Concept Note,1 Benito Müller put forward the idea of a Southern Solidarity Fund (SSF) to receive voluntary contributions from developing countries for South-South climate change cooperation. It is meant to be established by the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC or Convention) with a developing country Board, and to be operated by the Green Climate Fund (GCF), as an operating entity of the FCCC financial mechanism. As such, it is meant to give developing countries ‘the opportunity to provide support to their peers for climate change activities’2 which ‘should be able to avail itself of the best available delivery systems, such as is hoped will be established under the Green Climate Fund, in particular through Enhanced Direct Access, where operational decision-making is devolved to recipient countries.’

The Reformed Financial Mechanism II; Section III. Compliance Oversight

The Berlin Mandate, adopted during the early hours of 7 April 1995, marked the end of the first Conference of Parties (COP 1) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Berlin, Germany.1 The Mandate was one of the most important decisions of the COP, paving the way for the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol.2

As Chief Negotiator for Sweden, I participated actively in high-level informal consultations before the Berlin COP. During the COP, I chaired a high-level working group on the Berlin Mandate, which was established at the very beginning of the conference and worked all through, with meetings practically every day. My reflections in this paper seek to provide an insider’s view of the Berlin Mandate process, and draw lessons for the ongoing negotiations for a post-2020 climate regime.

PROPOSITION DU GROUPE DES PAYS LES MOINS AVANCES (PMA) dans le cadre du Plan díACTION DE BALI Soumise ‡ la CCNUCC AWG-LCA le 12 dÈcembre 2008avec Treize Questions/rÈponses - Taxe sur le transport aerien de passagers en faveur de l'adaptation (IAPAL)